Global Liquidity Trap: A Simple Analytical Investigation by Ippei Fujiwara et al.
 
 









INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
BANK OF JAPAN 
 
2-1-1 NIHONBASHI-HONGOKUCHO 




You can download this and other papers at the IMES Web site: 
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp 
 
Do not reprint or reproduce without permission. 
Global Liquidity Trap: A Simple Analytical Investigation 
 
Ippei Fujiwara, Nao Sudo, and Yuki Teranishi   
 

























NOTE:  IMES Discussion Paper Series is circulated in 
order  to  stimulate  discussion  and  comments.  Views 
expressed in Discussion Paper Series are those of 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Bank of Japan or the Institute for Monetary 
and Economic Studies.   IMES Discussion Paper Series 2009-E-31 
November 2009 
 
Global Liquidity Trap: A Simple Analytical Investigation 
 




How should monetary policy cooperation be designed when more than one country 
simultaneously faces zero lower bounds on nominal interest rates? To answer this 
question, we examine monetary policy cooperation with both optimal discretion 
and commitment policies in a two-country model. We reach the following 
conclusions. Under discretion, monetary policy cooperation is characterized by the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), a key parameter measuring 
international spillovers, and no history dependency. On the other hand, under 
commitment, monetary policy features history dependence with international 
spillover effects. 
 
Keywords: Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation; Zero Lower Bound 
JEL classification: E52, F33, F41 
 
*Director, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (currently, Financial Markets 
Department), Bank of Japan. (E-mail: ippei.fujiwara@boj.or.jp) 
** Associate Director, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.   
(E-mail: nao.sudou@boj.or.jp) 




This paper is the earlier version of the paper, ‘‘The Zero Lower Bound and Monetary Policy in a 
Global Economy: A Simple Analytical Investigation.’’ We thank Klaus Adam, Larry Christiano, 
Jordi Gali, Paolo Pesenti, Frank Smets, and Carl Walsh and participants at the Monetary Policy 
Challenges in Global Economy Conference 2009, Federal Reserve Board and Bank of Italy seminars 
for helpful discussions, and especially Andy Levin for helpful comments and suggestions. Views 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the 
Bank of Japan.   1 Introduction
The world economy now faces the largest economic downturn since World War II. To
prevent the economy from deteriorating further, most central banks in developed economies
simultaneously reduced policy interest rates to unprecedented low levels at speeds not
previously seen. As shown in Figure 1, the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the Bank of England
(BOE), and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) have virtually cut their policy rates to the
lowest possible level.1 Under such circumstances, with very little room for further monetary
easing, how should monetary policy cooperation be designed? Is there any role for the home
(foreign) central bank to assist the inactive foreign (home) monetary policy in the presence
of the zero lower bound?
Re￿ ecting on the recent economic experience in Japan, there have been several stud-
ies on monetary policy in the presence of a liquidity trap. Most, however, focus on the
closed economy. For example, Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Eggertsson and Wood-
ford (2003), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), and
Nakov (2008) outline the characteristics of desirable monetary policy under a zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates for a closed economy. Regarding the liquidity trap in the
open economy, Svensson (2001, 2003) and Coenen and Wieland (2003) investigate the zero
interest rate policy in open economies and stress the importance of the depreciation of
nominal exchange rates for a country caught in a liquidity trap. On the other hand, Naka-
jima (2008) shows that nominal exchange rates should appreciate for a country adopting a
zero interest rate policy under optimal commitment. These studies, however, only consider
the situation where a single country is at the zero lower bound. They do not provide a
framework capable of examining the current global situation. As far as we know, there
1￿Lowering of the Bank￿ s target for the uncollateralized overnight call rate by 20 basis points; it will be
encouraged to remain at around 0.1 percent￿(December 12, 2008, Statements on Monetary Policy, BOJ);
￿The Bank of England￿ s Monetary Policy Committee today voted to reduce the o¢ cial Bank Rate paid on
commercial bank reserves by 0.5 percentage points to 0.5% ...￿(March 5, 2009, News Release, BOE); ￿The
Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and anticipates that
economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended
period￿(March 18, 2009, Press Release, FRB). The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Canada
(BOC) have also set their policy rates at very low levels.
2have been no studies on the desirable conduct of monetary policy when more than one
country is simultaneously facing zero lower bounds on nominal interest rates.
The design of optimal monetary cooperation in the presence of the zero lower bound is
more complicated in an open economy under the zero lower bound. For example, we need
to consider possible gains from policy cooperation when only one country moves away from
the zero lower bound. We set up a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model where
both countries are at the zero lower bound because of temporary decreases in the natural
rate of interest. We provide a tractable framework for the analysis of monetary policy
cooperation with both discretion and commitment under the Markov equilibrium used in
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). We consider a case where central banks set their policy
interests depending only on the state of the economy. Consequently, the dynamic model
considered in this paper is reduced to a ￿nite number of linear simultaneous equations. In
our paper, the optimal monetary policy, which is obtained by minimizing the quadratic
social loss under policy cooperation, is characterized by an optimally chosen home policy
interest rate when the home country is free from the zero lower bound while the foreign
country is subject to the zero lower bound.
Our main conclusions are as follows. Under discretion, monetary policy cooperation is
in￿ uenced by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), a key parameter measur-
ing international spillover. The optimal exit policy becomes di⁄erent greatly depending on
whether IES is larger or smaller than unity. When home goods and foreign goods are com-
plements (substitutes), that is, when the inverse of IES is smaller (greater) than unity, the
country that has escaped the liquidity trap earlier chooses expansionary (contractionary)
monetary policy to boost economic activity in the country that is still caught in the liq-
uidity trap. However, discretionary policy does not have history dependence regardless of
the value of IES. Under commitment, optimal policy cooperation has history dependence.
By committing to easing future monetary conditions, the two central banks mitigate the
e⁄ects of the adverse shocks. Meanwhile, the level of policy interest rates change with IES.
Admittedly, our conclusion is not independent from several important assumptions.
First, preferences of agents in the home country and foreign country are identical. Second,
we assume that there are only home goods and foreign goods in the economy, and that
3there are no nontradeable goods. Third, there is a complete international ￿nancial market
so that agents in both countries can achieve perfect risk sharing. Fourth, agents in both
countries set prices in their own currency (￿producer-currency pricing￿ ). Thanks to these
assumptions that are used commonly in the literature, such as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002), we can provide an intuitive description of the monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the two-country
model used for analysis in this paper. Section 3 clari￿es the equilibrium concept and how a
dynamic two-country model can be represented by analytically tractable static equations.
Section 4 investigates the nature of the optimal monetary policy under discretion, and
Section 5 inquires into that under commitment. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the ￿ndings
in this paper and refers to future possible extensions.
2 The Model
The two-country model considered in this paper is very standard, as found in Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2003). Because we adopt the assumption of
complete international ￿nancial markets and assume a Markov equilibrium, it is convenient
to make use of history notation. That is, let st 2 S denote all the possible states of the
world that can occur in period t: Let
st = (s0;s1;:::;st)
denotes the history up until period t of the realized states of the world. The set of states,
S; contains only two elements. One is associated with a low level of the natural rate of
interest and the other is associated with a ￿normal￿level of the natural rate of interest.






























denote consumption and the supply of labor in history



































denote the wage rate and lump-sum pro￿ts and taxes in home
currency units. Furthermore, the object B
￿
st+1;st￿
is an Arrow security. It is the quantity
of home currency to be delivered in period t+1 if state st+1 is realized, conditional on history






denotes the price of consumption
goods.





























































where " > 1.











































In the above expression, E
￿
st￿
denotes the exchange rate, namely, units of home currency
per unit of foreign currency.
The household maximizes utility subject to its budget constraint, taking as given prices,
wages, exchange rates, and rates of return.
52.2 Firms

















is the common technology and the only stochastic disturbance. The marginal
















denotes a tax subsidy associated with the supply of labor, ￿nanced by a lump-
sum tax on households. The ith monopolist maximizes pro￿ts subject to its demand curve
derived from consumer preferences as in equation (2), and the Calvo (1983) price frictions.




, with probability 1 ￿ ￿, and










We assume similar production technology for the foreign country as well.
2.3 Market Clearing































Following the argument in Yun (2005), output of the homogeneous home good is related

























































We have similar clearing conditions for the foreign country.
2.4 Financial Market Equilibrium Condition































Under the symmetric preferences assumption, the real exchange rate is always unity. As
a result, equilibrium relative consumption also equals unity with suitable initial wealth

















where ￿;! > 0. It is important to note that, in our model, ￿ equals to the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (equivalently the degree of risk aversion) following
2For a formal proof of this point, see the proposition in Nakajima (2008).
7the notation of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and not the notation of Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) where ￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. From the ￿rst-
order necessary conditions in the optimization problem mentioned above, we can derive the
system of log-linearized equations as follows.3 The aggregate supply conditions are given










































for the foreign country, where
￿H =









(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
￿(1 + !")
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3For details of the derivations, see, for example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), Benigno and Benigno
(2003), and Nakajima (2008).






are de￿ned by the log deviation of outputs from











































are called the natural rates of interest. They are de￿ned as the real
interest rates that arise when both the home goods price and foreign goods price are ￿ exible.
Namely, we have
1






































Here, uH and uF are the marginal utilities of the household with respect to home goods
consumption and foreign goods consumption, respectively. It is notable that the natural








: Therefore, each of the natural rates of interest is
a⁄ected by the exogenous shocks occurring in both countries, such as technology shocks
or government expenditure shocks.5 In the following analysis, we examine the equilibrium
response of the economy when these natural rates of interest follow the law of motion,
such that they fall below the steady-state in a particular period and revert back to the
steady-state in subsequent periods with ￿xed probabilities. The probabilities are assumed
to be independent of each other for analytical convenience.
The equilibrium conditions are equations (7) to (10) with home and foreign monetary
policy equations, which are formalized to maximize social welfare. From the second-order






















are ￿ exible. See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) for related discussions.
5Thus, ￿scal policy is included in the natural interest rate shock in our model.






























We set the parameters as follows. One period in the model corresponds to a quarter.
We set ￿ = 0:99, " = 7:88, ￿ = 0:66, ! = 0:47, and n = 0:5. For ￿, three values are
considered: ￿ = 0:5, 1, and 5:988.7
2.6 International Spillover
Let us discuss international spillover. We show how international spillover is related to
￿. For this, we derive two equilibrium conditions. The ￿rst equation is the optimality





























where we used equation (3) and the de￿nition of the consumer price index derived as
the Hicksian demand function from equation (1). The other is the equation that relates
consumption of the home country household to the home country output, which is derived






















Note that only PF
￿
st￿






















, disappears from equations (12) and (13).
6For the derivation of the welfare loss function under policy cooperation, see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2003).
7For comparison with the literature, we choose ￿
￿1 = 2 and ￿
￿1 = 0:167; that are used by Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) and Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005), respectively.
10In this case, the marginal cost in the home country is determined only by variables of the
home country and there is no spillover from the foreign country. When ￿ 6= 1, however,
the foreign variable a⁄ects the home variables through the terms of trade. As shown by
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), spillover takes place through the two channels. The
￿rst channel is the ￿terms of trade e⁄ect,￿in which a rise in foreign output reduces the
marginal cost of the home country, via appreciation of the terms of trade, working through
the terms of trade, in equation (12). The second channel is the ￿risk sharing e⁄ect,￿in
which an increase in foreign output increases the marginal cost of the home country by
raising the consumption of the home country household, working through the terms of
trade in equation (13). Note that these two cancel out when ￿ = 1, and the two countries
become insular.
3 A Markov Equilibrium under a Global Liquidity Trap
Following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), we analytically investigate optimal monetary
policy under a Markov equilibrium for both discretionary policy and commitment policy.
To see the properties of the policies, we consider an experiment in which the two natural







2 fr;rg in the home and foreign country, respectively, fall
unexpectedly and simultaneously at period 0 from their steady-state value r to a negative
value r, and then simulate the optimal response of the policy rates to these adverse shocks.
Here, we set r =
1￿￿
￿ > 0 and r = ￿0:04=4 < 0. We assume that each natural rate of
interest reverts back to its steady-state value with a ￿xed probability in every subsequent
period, and that it stays there for good once it returns to the steady-state. More precisely,






= r at period t; rn
￿
st+1jst￿
remains r at period t+1 with constant probability p and returns to its steady-state value r









= r does not revert back to the steady-state until the
home country shock disappears. The foreign natural rate of interest returns to its steady-
state value r with constant probability 1 ￿ q after the home country shock rn
￿
st+1jst￿
returns to its steady-state value r. Thus, in our setting, the home country shock always
11disappears earlier than the foreign country shock does.
Here, the state of the economy is characterized by the signs of the natural rates of








= r hold, nz for the state where rn
￿
st￿












= r hold.8 Table 1 shows the transition probability of the
states in our model economy. For each row, the column reports the transition probability
that the state changes from the current state to the other state. Notice that the state nn
is an absorbing state, and the economy stays at the state nn with probability one once it
reaches this state.
For the tractability of our analysis on optimal commitment policy, we further assume
that central banks ￿x their policy rates within a state,9 but that they can change their
policy interest rates across di⁄erent states.10 For su¢ ciently large adverse shocks to the
natural rate of interest, it is natural to predict the following. (1) The two central banks
cooperatively set the policy interest rate of the country in which the adverse shock still
prevails to zero; that is, iHzz = iFzz = iFnz = 0, and (2) they set both of the policy interest
rates to the steady-state level of the natural rates of interest when both of the two adverse
shocks die out; that is, iH;nn = iF;nn = r. In this experiment, we assume these conditions
(1) and (2) actually hold by making r su¢ ciently negative to ensure that these conditions
are consistent with the optimality of the monetary policy implementation. Thanks to
condition (2), we have one other condition: (3) xH;nn = xF;nn = ￿H;nn = ￿￿
F;nn = 0,
because the economy is perfectly stabilized in this case.11 Given these conditions (1),
(2), and (3), optimal monetary policy is characterized by the optimal choice of iH;nz that
maximizes social welfare. Admittedly, the choice set di⁄ers between discretionary policy










= r does not exist.
9Because there are no endogenous state variables, dependency on the lagged variables stems solely from
the history dependent policy. Therefore, as long as we impose this condition, the solution below is consistent
with the nonlinear equilibrium conditions derived in the previous section.
10Fujiwara, Nakajima, Sudo, and Teranishi (2009) relax this condition and analyze the case in which the
central banks can also adjust their policy rates even within a state.
11Another way to justify this condition is to set the Ramsey planner￿ s discount factor very close to unity.
Together with the condition that there is no variation in the policy interest rates within the state, this
condition yields iH;nn = iF;nn = r.
12and commitment policy.
Under this Markov equilibrium, the dynamic system of equations consisting of equations
(7) to (10) collapses to a system of eight static equations. As for the equilibrium conditions
during the state zz, we obtain
￿H;zz = ￿HxH;zz + ￿H;F (1 ￿ n)xF;zz + ￿ [p￿H;zz + (1 ￿ p)￿H;nz]; (14)
￿￿
F;zz = ￿H;FnxH;zz + ￿FxF;zz + ￿
￿
p￿￿




0 = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)n][pxH;zz + (1 ￿ p)xH;nz ￿ xH;zz] (16)
+(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)[pxF;zz + (1 ￿ p)xF;nz ￿ xF;zz]
+p￿H;zz + (1 ￿ p)￿H;nz + r;
and
0 = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)][pxF;zz + (1 ￿ p)xF;nz ￿ xF;zz] (17)
+(￿ ￿ 1)n[pxH;zz + (1 ￿ p)xH;nz ￿ xH;zz]
+p￿￿
F;zz + (1 ￿ p)￿￿
F;nz + r:
For the state nz, we have
￿H;nz = ￿HxH;nz + ￿H;F (1 ￿ n)xF;nz + ￿q￿H;nz; (18)
￿￿
F;nz = ￿H;FnxH;nz + ￿FxF;nz + ￿q￿￿
F;nz; (19)
iH;nz = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)n](qxH;nz ￿ xH;nz)+(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)(qxF;nz ￿ xF;nz)+q￿H;nz+r; (20)
and
0 = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)](qxF;nz ￿ xF;nz) + (￿ ￿ 1)n(qxH;nz ￿ xH;nz) + q￿￿
F;nz + r: (21)
Now, we have eight unknowns, ￿H;zz, ￿￿
F;zz, xH;zz, xF;zz, ￿H;nz, ￿￿
F;nz, xH;nz, and xF;nz
for the eight equations above. Here, iH;nz is the policy variable that is chosen by the home
central bank.
134 Optimal Monetary Policy under Discretion
Under discretion, the home central bank chooses iH;nz to maximize social welfare taking
expectations as given for the state nz. The policy interest rate set by the home country
















subject to the following ￿ve constraints:
￿H;nz = ￿HxH;nz + ￿H;F (1 ￿ n)xF;nz;
￿￿
F;nz = ￿H;FnxH;nz + ￿FxF;nz;
iH;nz = ￿[1 + (￿ ￿ 1)n]xH;nz ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)xF;nz + r;
0 = ￿[1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)]xF;nz ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)nxH;nz + r;
and
iH;nz ￿ 0:
Assuming that the nonnegativity constraint on iH;nz does not bind, because there are
four constraints with four unknown variables, ￿H;nz, ￿￿
F;nz, xH;nz, and xF;nz, the optimal
discretionary policy is obtained by choosing iH;nz to minimize the loss function in equation
(22). When the nonnegativity constraint binds, iH;nz is set to zero. Because expectations
are taken as given by the two central banks at the state nz, the probability p does not
directly a⁄ect the optimal monetary policy. However, iH;nz indirectly depends on q, since
the economic structure at the state nz is a⁄ected by the future expectation associated with
q.
Simulation results are shown in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate how
policy interest rate, output, and in￿ ation change with the expected duration of the adverse
shock in the foreign country, namely, q, for the state zz and the state nz, respectively. Here,
we ￿x the other parameters including p = 0:25. Similarly, Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate how
the variables change with the expected duration of the adverse shock in the home country,
namely, p, for the state zz and the state nz, respectively, keeping the other parameters
including q = 0:25.
14Under discretion, the optimal monetary policy iH;nz is characterized by the size of the
international spillover, that is captured by the parameter ￿.12 We ￿rst describe this using
Table 3. When ￿ = 1, the output and in￿ ation in the home country are perfectly stabilized
at the state nz by setting iH;nz =
1￿￿
￿ , regardless of the value of q. Because the output
gap and in￿ ation in the foreign country does not a⁄ect those of the home country in this
case, the expected duration of the foreign adverse shock does not a⁄ect the home variables.
For the foreign country, on the other hand, output gap and in￿ ation vary with q, because
longer q implies that the foreign adverse shock stays longer. When q increases from 0.0
to 0.75, the output gap and in￿ ation in the foreign country decrease monotonically. On
the other hand, they take positive values when q = 0:90. In this case, under our restricted
solution, the longer expected adverse shock together with the zero interest rate induces too
much easing in terms of the real interest rate since an elasticity of the in￿ ation to output
gap increases as q increases.13 When ￿ 6= 1, there is international spillover and the home
central bank sets iH;nz, depending on ￿, because of the two reasons. First, the two central
banks focus on the monetary policy coordination, and the home country sets the policy
interest rate to maximize the global welfare rather than the home country welfare. Second,
there is the interaction between the two countries through the economic structure as we
discussed above. Consequently, the size of iH;nz is characterized by ￿.14 To illustrate this,
we rewrite the IS equation for the foreign country at the state nz as follows:
12The key parameter of interdependence across countries may change according to the model speci￿cation.
In this paper, we employ the standard new open macroeconomy model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), or Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) in which many of the properties of international
spillover are studied. In this model, the interdependence is well captured by the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution parameter ￿. However, when we assume a di⁄erent utility following Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Hu⁄man (1988), for example, the other parameters may play a key role a⁄ecting the
interdependence e⁄ects across countries.
13As we see below, we have the similar situation for the case where p takes a large value for both under
discretion and under commitment under a given zero interest rate.
14More precisely, under the cooperative policy, the two central banks maximize the welfare given by
equation (11). Under the non-cooperative policy, each central bank maximizes its own welfare. Admittedly
the two optimal policy interest rates can di⁄er since objectives are di⁄erent. See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2002) for the comparison of the two policies in the case where two countries are not in the liquidity trap.
15iF;nz = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)](qxF;nz ￿ xF;nz) + (￿ ￿ 1)n(qxH;nz ￿ xH;nz) + q￿￿
F;nz + r:
We ￿rst consider the case in which the two countries are insular (￿ = 1). When the
zero lower bound constraint is binding, this IS equation is reduced to
0 = (q ￿ 1)xF;nz + q￿￿
F;nz + r:
In this case, as we discussed in Section 2.6, there is no spillover e⁄ect across countries. Thus,
the home central bank does not have any international spillover a⁄ecting the dynamics of
the output gap xF;nz and in￿ ation ￿￿
F;nz in the above equation.
We now turn to the case in which there is an interdependence between the two countries
(￿ 6= 1) and the zero lower bound is binding:
0 = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ n)](qxF;nz ￿ xF;nz) + (￿ ￿ 1)n(qxH;nz ￿ xH;nz) + q￿￿
F;nz + r:
It is obvious from the third term on the right-hand side of the above equation that if
￿ > (<) 1; the de￿ ationary pressure to the foreign output gap and in￿ ation is mitigated
by decreasing (increasing) the home output gap xH;nz, to net out the negative natural
rate of interest in the foreign country. In particular, while the foreign output and in￿ ation
are negative, the home central bank sets its policy rate higher (lower) than the case of
￿ = 1 when ￿ > (<) 1, so that the home output declines (rises) compared with the case
of ￿ = 1. By setting the appropriate policy interest rate, the negative output gap of
the foreign country is reduced even in the liquidity trap, and the welfare loss of the two
countries associated with the adverse shocks is reduced.15 This result is consistent with
the existing literature that discusses the spillover of monetary policy across countries. For
instance, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), using a framework similar to ours, report that a
foreign monetary expansion has a negative (positive) impact on home output when ￿ >
(<) 1, because the two goods are substitutes (complements) and the marginal utility of
15Table 3 shows that when q is su¢ ciently large, the adverse shock in the foreign country causes the
positive output and in￿ ation, rather than negative output and in￿ ation in the foreign country. In this case,
the home central bank sets iH;nz lower (higher) than the case of ￿ = 1 for ￿ > (<) 1; so as to mitigate the
in￿ ationary pressure in the foreign country.
16home goods decreases (increases) with the consumption of foreign goods. Based on their
arguments, therefore, to increase the output gap in the home country, foreign output needs
to be lower (higher) for ￿ > (<) 1.
Table 5 shows the case for p. The role of international spillover is clearly observed in
how the home policy interest rate is set depending on ￿. In contrast to q, the expectation
about the adverse shock in the home country p, does not a⁄ect the economy at the state
nz, since the state nz has realized already. This result contrasts sharply with that under
the quasi-optimal commitment policy as shown in the later section. This is because the
central banks take the values of future variables as given under discretionary policy.
As shown in Table 2 and 4, the variables at the state nz a⁄ect those at the state zz
through the agents￿expectations. When ￿ = 1, the home variables at the state zz are
independent from the variations in q, and dependent on the variations in p, because longer
duration of the adverse state in the foreign country does not in￿ uence the home country.
The foreign variables, on the other hand, vary with both p and q, because both duration
parameters a⁄ect the expected duration that the foreign adverse shock prevails. When
￿ 6= 1, the home country is a⁄ected by q, because of the presence of the spillover e⁄ect
from the foreign country.
To summarize the results under discretion, the nature of the optimal cooperative mon-
etary policy is characterized by international spillover. When two countries are not insular,
a country can mitigate the de￿ ationary pressure of the other country by boosting or con-
tracting its own economy.
5 Quasi-optimal Policy under Commitment
We next discuss our commitment policy. We call the commitment monetary policy under
our setting as quasi-optimal commitment policy, since we restrict the state dynamics as
explained above. Under quasi-optimal commitment policy, the home central bank under
cooperation chooses iH;nz to minimize the present discounted value of the social loss in

































subject to equations (14) to (21), and the zero lower bound constraint
iH;nz ￿ 0:
The analytical form of this loss function (23) is shown in the Appendix.
Simulation results are shown in Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9. Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate how
policy interest rate, output, and in￿ ation change with the expected duration of the adverse
shock in the home country, namely, p, for the state zz and the state nz, respectively. Here,
we ￿x the other parameters including q = 0:25. Similarly, Tables 8 and 9 demonstrate how
the variables change with the expected duration of the adverse shock in the foreign country,
namely, q, for the state zz and the state nz, respectively, keeping the other parameters
including p = 0:25.
Under commitment, the optimal monetary policy iH;nz is characterized by the history
dependency as well as the international spillover. As Table 7 shows, in contrast to discretion
displayed in Table 3, the policy interest rate is a⁄ected by p even though the state nz has
realized already. This is a pure e⁄ect of the monetary policy commitment, since the central
banks take the values of future variables into consideration under commitment. The home
country￿ s output gap and in￿ ation increase with p, since greater policy stimulus is needed
to o⁄set the contractionary impact of the longer expected duration of the adverse shock
in the home country. In addition to this history dependency, there is the international
spillover e⁄ect. When ￿ > (<) 1, the home policy interest rate iH;nz is set higher (lower)
than the case of ￿ = 1, being consistent with the discussion in the previous section.
Next we discuss the relationship between iH;nz and q, shown in Table 9. Lower q implies
a shorter expected duration of the state nz, during which the home central bank is able
to maintain its accommodative monetary policy. When ￿ = 1, there is no foreign e⁄ect.
Thus the home central bank sets lower value for iH;nz for a smaller q, only to mitigate
18the e⁄ect of the adverse shock in the home country at the state zz. As q increases, the
home policy interest rate becomes less accommodative, because the accommodative period
becomes longer in the good state for the home country. When ￿ 6= 1, there is international
spillover e⁄ect as well as history dependency, and the relationship between the expected
duration and the policy interest rate becomes less evident.
Similarly to the results under discretion, the variables at the state nz a⁄ect those at
the state zz through the agents￿expectations. Under commitment, however, even when
￿ = 1, the home variables at the state zz vary with q as well as with p, re￿ ecting the fact
that setting of the policy interest rate is history dependent under commitment policy:
In summary, the monetary policy cooperation under commitment is characterized by
the history dependence existing studies have found in a closed economy, which is contrary
to the results under discretion.16 However, similar to the outcomes under discretion, the
level of these low optimal policy rates is determined by the size of ￿. An additional ￿nding
in the two-country model is that there are two ways to mitigate the e⁄ect of adverse shocks.
One is the international spillover channel through which one of the central banks a⁄ects the
output and in￿ ation in the other country through the interdependence of the two countries.
The other is the intertemporal (or history dependent) channel through which both central
banks commit to lower future policy interest rates to mitigate the adverse shocks.
6 Welfare analysis
Table 10, 11, 12, and 13 report the expected welfare loss given by (23) under discretion
policy and quasi-optimal commitment policy, for various sizes of p and q. The loss, in
general, tends to be small when the expected duration of the adverse shocks are small.
The comparisons among the tables illustrate the gains from the commitment. Clearly, the
welfare loss is smaller under the quasi-optimal commitment policy than that under the
discretion for every combinations of p and q as implied by Woodford (2003).
16As shown in Adam and Billi (2007), if an economy falls into a liquidity trap again after being in the
steady-state, optimal discretionary policy may have history dependency.
197 Conclusion
How should monetary policy cooperation be designed when more than one country simul-
taneously face zero lower bounds on nominal interest rates? To answer this question, we
provided a tractable framework within a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model
under a Markov equilibrium. Analysis of the nature of optimal policy cooperation in such
a situation provides the key feature of the policy under optimal discretionary and commit-
ment policies. Under discretion, optimal monetary policy cooperation is characterized by
no history dependency and international spillover in which the parameter of IES plays an
important role. On the other hand, under commitment, monetary policy is characterized
by history dependence. It is recommended that the country commits to low future nominal
interest rates. Quantitatively, the size of ￿; the inverse of IES, a⁄ects the optimal level of
interest rates.
Yet, in practice, making credible commitments to future policy is a di¢ cult task in open
economies. Central banks need to e⁄ectively inform citizens not only in the home country
but also in foreign countries about the nature of the commitments. At the same time,
agents across the globe would fully understand the statements made by the central banks,
regardless of whether these are written in their own language or not. Thus, because of these
potential obstacles in implementing cooperative commitment policy in open economies, it
is equally important for central banks to understand the paths of the policy interest rates
under optimal discretion policy.
There are several possible extensions to this study. First, we should investigate the
nature of policy cooperation for a global liquidity trap with a less-restrictive model frame-
work. In this paper, we assume that central banks maintain policy interest rates within
a state to obtain analytical solutions and clear policy implications in a tractable manner.
Although we believe that there should not be qualitatively signi￿cant di⁄erences, it would
be worth analyzing policy cooperation without this restriction.17 Second, to suggest real
monetary policy implementations, it is important to incorporate more empirical realism
17Our accompanying paper, Fujiwara, Nakajima, Sudo, and Teranishi (2009), provides the solution of the
optimal monetary policy using a model with a general setting.
20through estimation and a richer model structure. Third, it would be intriguing to gauge
the gains from cooperation for a global liquidity trap by comparing the welfare loss under
cooperation with that under noncooperation. Here, it would also be interesting to think of
a situation where one country deviates from cooperation. We will address these issues in
future research.
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23Appendix: Loss Function under Commitment
By substituting equations (14) to (21) into equation (23) and using the formula for the












































































































































































































24Table 1: Transition probability.
zz nz nn
zz p 1 ￿ p 0
nz 0 q 1 ￿ q
nn 0 0 1
25Table 2: Policy interest rate, output gap and in￿ ation under discretion at state zz for
various size of q: Variables are presented in terms of percentage points at annual rates.
q = 0:0 q = 0:5 q = 0:75 q = 0:90
￿H;zz -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
￿ = 1 xH;zz -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -1.0 -2.2 -14.7 6.6
xF;zz -2.5 -4.0 -16.5 3.4
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;zz -0.4 -0.1 8.7 -0.3
￿ = 0:5 xH;zz -2.7 -2.7 4.6 -0.9
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -1.1 -2.5 -17.5 6.3
xF;zz -4.2 -6.4 -23.2 3.6
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;zz -0.5 -0.7 -3.4 -0.7
￿ = 5:988 xH;zz -0.2 0.2 1.2 -2.4
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -0.7 -1.7 -8.5 7.0
xF;zz -0.6 -1.2 -4.2 2.9
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
26Table 3: Policy interest rate, output gap and in￿ ation under discretion at state nz for
various size of q: Variables are presented in terms of percentage points at annual rates.
q = 0:0 q = 0:5 q = 0:75 q = 0:90
￿H;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿ = 1 xH;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
iH;nz 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
￿F;nz -0.2 -1.0 -10.0 5.7
xF;nz -1.0 -2.2 -11.4 2.8
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;nz 0.1 0.3 6.5 0.1
￿ = 0:5 xH;nz 0.1 0.1 5.9 0.8
iH;nz 2.4 2.5 0.7 4.2
￿F;nz -0.2 -1.1 -11.7 5.5
xF;nz -1.3 -3.0 -15.1 3.4
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;nz -0.1 -0.3 -2.2 -0.3
￿ = 5:988 xH;nz 0.1 0.3 1.0 -1.2
iH;nz 6.4 5.9 6.6 3.7
￿F;nz -0.2 -0.8 -5.8 6.0
xF;nz -0.3 -0.9 -3.1 1.8
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
27Table 4: Policy interest rate, output gap and in￿ ation under discretion at state zz for
various size of p: Variables are presented in terms of percentage points at annual rates.
p = 0:0 p = 0:5 p = 0:75 p = 0:90
￿H;zz -0.2 -1.0 -9.9 5.7
￿ = 1 xH;zz -1.0 -2.2 -11.4 2.8
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -1.0 -2.2 -14.7 6.6
xF;zz -2.5 -4.0 -16.5 3.4
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;zz -0.1 -1.1 -33.7 4.9
￿ = 0:5 xH;zz -1.9 -4.6 -61.0 3.8
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -1.1 -2.7 -40.3 6.2
xF;zz -3.9 -7.1 -68.0 4.7
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;zz -0.4 -1.1 -5.5 6.9
￿ = 5:988 xH;zz -0.0 -0.2 -0.5 0.7
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -0.7 -1.6 -7.7 7.3
xF;zz -0.7 -1.0 -2.8 1.0
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
28Table 5: Policy interest rate, output gap and in￿ ation under discretion at state nz for
various size of p: Variables are presented in terms of percentage points at annual rates.
p = 0:0 p = 0:5 p = 0:75 p = 0:90
￿H;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿ = 1 xH;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
iH;nz 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
￿F;nz -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
xF;nz -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;nz 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
￿ = 0:5 xH;nz 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
iH;nz 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
￿F;nz -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
xF;nz -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;nz -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
￿ = 5:988 xH;nz -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
iH;nz 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
￿F;nz -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
xF;nz -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
29Table 6: Policy interest rate, output gap and in￿ ation under commitment at state zz for
various size of p: Variables are presented in terms of percentage points at annual rates.
p = 0:0 p = 0:5 p = 0:75 p = 0:90
￿H;zz -0.0 -0.0 -5.1 4.7
￿ = 1 xH;zz -0.6 -0.8 -6.3 2.1
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -1.0 -2.2 -14.7 6.6
xF;zz -2.5 -4.0 -16.4 3.4
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;zz 0.2 -0.2 -27.4 4.4
￿ = 0:5 xH;zz -1.1 -2.9 -51.1 3.3
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -1.1 -2.5 -36.9 6.3
xF;zz -3.7 -6.4 -61.3 4.6
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;zz -0.3 -0.5 -3.3 5.4
￿ = 5:988 xH;zz -0.1 -0.4 -1.2 0.1
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -0.8 -1.7 -8.5 7.2
xF;zz -0.8 -1.4 -4.3 1.3
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
30Table 7: Policy interest rate, output gap and in￿ ation under commitment at state nz for
various size of p: Variables are presented in terms of percentage points at annual rates.
p = 0:0 p = 0:5 p = 0:75 p = 0:90
￿H;nz 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4
￿ = 1 xH;nz 0.4 1.1 1.4 1.4
iH;nz 3.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
￿F;nz -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
xF;nz -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;nz 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
￿ = 0:5 xH;nz 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.4
iH;nz 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;nz -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
xF;nz -1.5 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;nz -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4
￿ = 5:988 xH;nz 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.4
iH;nz 5.4 4.0 3.7 0.0
￿F;nz -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
xF;nz -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -1.4
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
31Table 8: Policy interest rate, output gap and in￿ ation under commitment at state zz for
various size of q: Variables are presented in terms of percentage points at annual rates.
q = 0:0 q = 0:5 q = 0:75 q = 0:90
￿H;zz -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
￿ = 1 xH;zz -0.6 -0.9 -1.1 -1.3
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -1.0 -2.2 -14.7 6.6
xF;zz -2.5 -4.0 -16.5 3.4
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;zz 0.0 0.4 9.2 -0.2
￿ = 0:5 xH;zz -1.6 -1.7 5.3 -0.8
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -1.1 -2.4 -17.2 6.3
xF;zz -3.9 -6.0 -22.7 3.6
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;zz -0.3 -0.5 -3.4 -0.6
￿ = 5:988 xH;zz -0.2 0.4 1.2 -2.3
iH;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿F;zz -0.8 -1.7 -8.5 7.0
xF;zz -0.8 -1.4 -4.2 2.8
iF;zz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
32Table 9: Policy interest rate, output gap and in￿ ation under commitment at state nz for
various size of q: Variables are presented in terms of percentage points at annual rates.
q = 0:0 q = 0:5 q = 0:75 q = 0:90
￿H;nz 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
￿ = 1 xH;nz 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.0
iH;nz 1.2 3.3 4.0 4.1
￿F;nz -0.2 -1.0 -9.9 5.7
xF;nz -1.0 -2.2 -11.4 2.8
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;nz 0.2 0.6 6.8 0.2
￿ = 0:5 xH;nz 1.0 1.0 6.5 0.8
iH;nz 0.0 1.5 0.6 4.3
￿F;nz -0.2 -1.1 -11.6 5.5
xF;nz -1.0 -2.7 -14.7 3.4
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿H;nz 0.0 -0.1 -2.2 -0.2
￿ = 5:988 xH;nz 0.4 0.5 1.0 -1.2
iH;nz 4.5 5.4 6.6 3.7
￿F;nz -0.2 -0.8 -5.8 6.0
xF;nz -0.5 -1.0 -3.1 1.8
iF;nz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
33Table 10: Expected social welfare loss at the state zz for various size of p under discretion
(numbers are multiplied by 107).
p = 0:0 p = 0:5 p = 0:75 p = 0:90
￿ = 1 70 516 43;549 22;413
￿ = 0:5 107 875 411;564 18;990
￿ = 5:988 34 260 11;316 29;073
34Table 11: Expected social welfare loss at the state zz for various size of q under discretion
(numbers are multiplied by 107).
q = 0:0 q = 0:5 q = 0:75 q = 0:90
￿ = 1 87 382 23;753 11;247
￿ = 0:5 146 556 43;070 10;548
￿ = 5:988 40 204 8;434 12;375
35Table 12: Expected social welfare loss at the state zz for various size of p under commitment
(numbers are multiplied by 107).
p = 0:0 p = 0:5 p = 0:75 p = 0:90
￿ = 1 68 434 33;572 19;505
￿ = 0:5 99 677 314;317 17;420
￿ = 5:988 33 233 10;581 23;507
36Table 13: Expected social welfare loss at the state zz for various size of q under commitment
(numbers are multiplied by 107).
q = 0:0 q = 0:5 q = 0:75 q = 0:90
￿ = 1 76 374 23;748 11;245
￿ = 0:5 117 530 43;033 10;547
















Figure 1: Policy interest rates.
Note: All data are from central banks: the call rate for Japan, the federal fund rate for United
States, the main re￿nancing operations ￿xed rate for Euro area, the bank rate for United Kingdom,
and the overnight rate target for Canada.
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